






YOU ARE HERE: A MANIFESTO 
 






for Aranye Fradenburg: the work is to keep moving, 
but also to keep living 
 
 
The poet produces the beautiful by fixing his attention on 
something real. It is the same with an act of love. . . . The 
authentic and pure values—truth, beauty and goodness—in 
the activity of a human being are the result of one and the 
same act, a certain application of the full attention to the 
object. 
 
Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace1 
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1 Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, trans. Emma Crawford and 
Mario von der Ruhr (London: Routledge, 1952), 119. 




PROLEGOMENON: A MENTAL HANDOUT 
 
Imagine a piece of paper, completely blank, except for a 
small black dot directly in the center. And then a small 
arrow pointing to the dot, and next to that, the phrase is 
written, “You Are Here.” Strictly speaking, the dot is 
where you are. Paraphrasing Italo Calvino’s short story, 
“All At One Point,” which describes the time before the 
universe expanded, when all of matter was concen-
trated in a single point, and everyone and everything, in 
the words of the narrator, “was packed in there like 
sardines,”2 every point of each of us coincides with 
every point of everyone else in a single point, which is 
where we all are. There is nowhere else. The idea of 
distance, or separation, or estrangement, is a dream. 
Which is not to say we should not mind the gaps. 
 
IDEATION WITHOUT BODIES/THE DROWNED WORLD 
 
The strangest thing is that I am not at all inclined to call 
myself insane, I clearly see that I am not: all these changes 
concern objects. At least, that is what I’d like to be sure of. 
 
from the notebooks of Antoine Roquentin3 
 
In J.G. Ballard’s short story, “The Overloaded Man,” the 
main character, Faulkner, is “slowly going insane.”4 In a 
nutshell, he’s become dissatisfied with life in general, 
and having quit his job, he waits impatiently for his wife 
to leave every morning so that he can engage in a 
certain daily secret ritual. Living in a development 
called “the Bin”—a “sprawl of interlocking frosted glass, 
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2 Italo Calvino, “All At One Point,” in Cosmicomics, trans. 
William Weaver (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1968), 43 [43–47]. 
3 Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Richard Howard (New York: 
New Directions, 2007), 2. 
4 J.G. Ballard, “The Overloaded Man,” in The Best Short Stories 
of J.G. Ballard (New York: Picador, 1995), 112 [112–124]. 




white rectangles and curves, at first glance abstract and 
exciting . . . but to the people within formless and 
visually exhausting”5—Faulkner is eager to dematerial-
ize his surroundings. Sitting on his veranda each day, 
he engages in a process of intense visualization, turning 
the entire field of recognizable “objects” in his view into 
“disembodied” forms, leading to a randomized, 
geometric “cubist landscape.”6 Unknowingly following 
some of the thing-logics laid out by Bill Brown in his 
2001 essay, “Thing Theory,” Faulkner reduces the world 
to thingness, where “things” denote both the “amor-
phousness out of which objects are materialized by the 
(ap)perceving subject” (things as the “anterior 
physicality of the physical world”) and also the ways in 
which the world always exceeds our ability to 
apprehend it (things as “sensuous” and “metaphysical” 
presences that exceed their “materialization as objects 
or their mere utilization in objects”).7 
As in the bricolage technique of the Surrealists, 
which Brown refers to in his essay, Faulkner operates a 
variety of “cut-out switches” that sever objects from 
their always already “tenuous” hold on reality and 
thereby crafts what he believes is an “escape route” 
from a world he finds tedious and “intolerable.” But 
Faulkner also believes, perhaps perversely, that “it was 
pleasant to see the world afresh again, to wallow in an 
endless panorama of brilliantly colored images. What 
did it matter if there was form but no content?” 8 
Nevertheless, as the verbs of Ballard’s story suggest—
deleting, blotting, switching off, repressing, vanishing, 
obliterating, eliminating, erasing, stripping, reducing, 
demolishing, etc.—what Faulkner is really doing is 
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5 Ballard, “The Overloaded Man,” 114. 
6 Ballard, “The Overloaded Man,” 115. 
7 Bill Brown, “Thing Theory,” Critical Inquiry 28 (Autumn 
2001): 5 [1–22]. 
8 Ballard, “The Overloaded Man,” 116. 




deleting the world and all “traces of meaning” from that 
world, until even the cubist shapes he has reduced it to 
also begin to 
 
lose their meaning, the abstract masses of 
color dissolving, drawing Faulkner after them 
into a world of pure psychic sensation, where 
blocks of ideation hung like magnetic fields in 
a cloud chamber. . . .9  
 
Eventually, he also discovers that, in addition to his 
surroundings, his own body, which “seemed an 
extension of his mind,” has vanished as well. That is, 
until his wife shows up and starts screaming at him and 
he decides to “dismantle” her as well, “erasing all his 
memories” of her “motion and energy,” and turning her 
into “a bundle of obtrusive angles.”10 And yet, what he 
precisely cannot erase is the motion of her body 
fastening onto his, at which point he decides to 
“smooth and restrain her, molding her angular form 
into a softer and rounder one.”11 In other words, he 
strangles her to death.  
As it turns out, even when you visually “dismantle” 
and erase the world and all of its “objects,” including 
persons, they still retain their insistently sensuous and 
metaphysical thingness and demand your attention. 
Bodies continue to press in, even your own. And what 
Faulkner ultimately seeks is  
 
pure ideation, the undisturbed sensation of 
psychic being untransmuted by any physical 
medium. Only thus could he escape the 
nausea of the external world. 
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9 Ballard, “The Overloaded Man,” 118. 
10 Ballard, “The Overloaded Man,” 123. 
11 Ballard, “The Overloaded Man,” 124. 




And so, seeking “an absolute continuum of existence 
uncontaminated by material excrescences,” he drowns 
himself in a shallow pond at the far end of his garden 
while looking up at the “blue disk” of the sky, 12 which 
he believes is somehow the only space freed of mater-
iality. The sky is teeming with materiality, of course. 
The world remains, and Faulkner himself, even as a 
dead body, is still enmeshed with that world, and with 
his own body (he is his body), which cannot really be 
obliterated—at least, not by Faulkner thinking it away. 
Another way of putting this might be to say, even when 
you are dead, you are still here. 
In another story by Ballard, “The Concentration 
City,” Franz M., a physics student who lives at 3599719 
West 783rd Street, is obsessed with trying to leave the 
City, which is comprised of seemingly endless buildings 
and streets and is “as old as time and continuous with 
it.”13 Although even just one sector of the City is “one 
hundred thousand cubic miles,” Franz M. is convinced 
that somewhere beyond an outer boundary there is 
endless “free space” and he attempts to traverse the 
entire length of the City in one direction on a high-
speed train in order to find a limitless Outside that he 
believes must exist. But through some trick of time-
space curvature that is built into the train tracks he only 
ends up back where he started, with no time having 
elapsed, even though he was gone for three weeks. 
Although Franz M. continues to doggedly insist, even 
while being carted off to the psychiatrists, that the City 
must have “bounds,” the City itself fills up all of time 
and space and cannot be traversed, or even imagined, 
as some sort of totality that could be crossed beyond. 
For the reader, as for Franz M., this is supposed to feel 
like a nightmare.  
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12 Ballard, “The Overloaded Man,” 124. 
13 J.G. Ballard, “The Concentration City,” in The Best Short 
Stories of J.G. Ballard, 19 [1–20]. 




YOU ARE HERE/THIS MUST BE THE PLACE 
 
I guess that this must be the place, 
I can’t tell one from another. 
Did I find you, or you find me? 
There was a time before we were born, 
If someone asks, this is where I’ll be, where I’ll be. 
 
The Talking Heads, “This Must be the Place” 
 
In her book Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of 
Things, Jane Bennett mentions Hent de Vries’s idea of 
the “absolute” as an “‘intangible and imponderable 
recalcitrance” that points to 
 
a something that is not an object of know-
ledge, that is detached or radically free from 
representation, and thus nothing at all. No-
thing but the force or the effectivity of the 
detachment, that is.14  
 
Important to note here is that while this “absolute” may 
be radically detached from our world and systems of 
knowledge, it has also somehow come loose from that 
very same world and systems of knowledge, and 
therefore, it is both gone, yet also still here. In some 
systems this “absolute” could be God, but more 
importantly, for De Vries, it marks a place, or a Thing, 
which has “loosen[ed] its ties to existing contexts.” 
Similar to the “thing-power” that Bennett articulates in 
her book, De Vries’s notion of the absolute “seeks to 
acknowledge that which refuses to dissolve completely 
into the milieu of human knowledge,” but whereas De 
Vries conceives of this absolute as an epistemological 
limit on human knowing that also hovers, recalcitrantly, 
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14 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 3. 




“between immanence and transcendence,” Bennett 
wants to return matter (“things”) to a more “earthy, 
not-quite human capaciousness” in which things 
would be released from their “long history of attach-
ment to automatism or mechanism.”15 
Thinking of Ballard’s two stories again, we might 
say that they both take up different forms of De Vries’s 
version of the completely detached and non-earthy 
absolute (both characters are trying to literally loosen 
themselves from their respective worlds), and both 
stories also illustrate the anxiety and despair brought 
on by a desire to either inhabit the absolute position 
(which, ultimately, is never human, or let’s say, 
liveable) or to somehow cross beyond it, to believe that 
there must be an Outside (an exterior) that would 
unfold or unfurl somehow from a more locally-
positioned world contained by our mapping devices, 
which is to say, our minds, as well as our satellites. 
Without this Outside, we feel trapped, hemmed “in”—
although strictly speaking, if there is no Outside, there 
is also no Inside. There is only here, and to quote the 
Talking Heads, “this must be the place.” 
With Timothy Morton, I believe that “there is no 
definite ‘within’ or ‘outside’ of beings”—for example, 
every time you breathe in oxygen you are inhaling “a 
by-product of the first Archæn beings (from 2.5 billion 
years ago back to an undefined limit after the origin of 
Earth 4.5 billion years ago)” and the “hills are teeming 
with the skeletal silence of dead life forms”—but as 
Morton also reminds us, we can’t really “get along 
without these concepts [of inside and outside] either.”16 
Nevertheless, if we’re going to formulate any sort 
of ethics that takes interdependence and coexistence 
(or what Morton terms “coexistentialism”) seriously, as 
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15 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 3. 
16  Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2010), 39. 




Morton argues, we’re going to have to dissolve “the 
barrier between ‘over here’ and ‘over there,’ and more 
fundamentally, the metaphysical illusion of rigid, 
narrow boundaries between inside and outside.”17 And 
while we may certainly be in something—following the 
physicist David Bohm’s idea of the “implicate order,”18 
everything might be folded into everything else—
nevertheless, this is a something, or a someplace, “that 
has no center or edge,” and there can never be “a 
background against which our thinking makes sense.”19  
There is still separation and difference, however, 
and this is an important point. As Morton puts it, “all 
beings are related to each other negatively and 
differentially,” and while there is no authentic zero-
point of origin or “specific flavor” for any one being (no 
absolute uniqueness)—“evolution jumbles bodies like a 
dream jumbles words and image”20—nor is there any 
way to hold the life and non-life distinction in place, 
nor can we hold the human and non-human dis-
tinction in place, nor is consciousness necessarily 
intentional or even “superior” (“sentience” may be the 
lowest, and not the highest, function implicit in evolu-
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17 Morton, The Ecological Thought, 39. 
18 On David Bohm’s thinking on the implicate, enfolded order 
of the universe, see David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate 
Order (London: Routledge, 1980) and “The Enfolding-
Unfolding Universe and Consciousness (1980),” in The Essen-
tial David Bohm, ed. Lee Nichol (London: Routledge, 2003), 
78–138.  
19 Timothy Morton, “Materialism Expanded and Remixed,” 
conference paper presented at “New Materialisms,” Johns 
Hopkins University, April 13-14, 2010: 11 [1–17]; http://www. 
scribd.com/doc/25830212/Materialism-Expanded-and-Remi 
xed.  
20 Morton, The Ecological Thought, 66, 65. 




tion),21 and evolution itself may be pointless. Never-
theless, as Morton also asserts, 
 
We can’t in good faith cancel the difference 
between humans and nonhumans. Nor can 
we preserve it. Doing both at the same time 
would be inconsistent. We’re in a bind. But . . . 
. The bind is a sign of an emerging democracy 
of life forms.22 
 
Subjectivity may ultimately be a bottomless void, but 
saying that there is no coherent “something” there 
(with mappable contours and limits) is not the same 
thing as saying there is “nothing” there at all. Cadging 
from Morton, something is always “seeping through.”23 
Further, every object I encounter, including persons 
(human and nonhuman), in Steven Shaviro’s words, 
both draws me “into extended referential networks 
whose full ramifications I cannot trace” and also 
“bursts forth” in its singularity, “stun[ning] me in 
excess of anything that I can posit about it.”24 So, for 
me, the trick in going forward now, as regards an ethics 
of interdependence, or co-implicated dependence, also 
means becoming more, and not less, human. The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 On this point regarding sentience as a possibly “lower” 
achievement of evolutionary biology, see Morton, The 
Ecological Thought, 72. I would also point those interested in 
this idea to the work of Rodney Brooks, who directs the 
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at M.I.T., and to his influen-
tial paper, “Elephants Don’t Play Chess,” Robotics and 
Autonomous Systems 6 (1990): 3–15. 
22 Morton, The Ecological Thought, 76. 
23 Morton, The Ecological Thought, 113. 
24 Steven Shaviro, “The Universe of Things,” symposium pa-
per presented at “Object-Oriented Ontology,” Georgia Tech. 
University, April 3, 2010: 7 [1–18]; http://www.shaviro.com/ 
Blog/?p=893. 




human is also an inescapable here, a someplace, and 
not a no-place.  
 
A TEXT IS A SENTIENT OBJECT/OBJECTS IN THE MIRROR ARE 
CLOSER THAN THEY APPEAR/YOU ARE CLOSER TO ME THAN 
IT APPEARS/THE PAST IS CLOSER THAN IT APPEARS/YOU DO 
NO SERVICE TO HISTORY BY KEEPING IT BEHIND YOU/I WISH 
WE COULD GO ON TALKING LIKE THIS BUT I HAVE TO MOVE 
BEYOND THE TITLE OF THIS SECTION 
 
. . . contrary to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not 
an image of the world. It forms a rhizome with the world, 
there is an aparallel evolution of the book and the world; the 
book assures the deterritorialization of the world, but the 
world effects a reterritorialization of the book, which in turn 
deterritorializes itself in the world (if it’s capable, if it can). 
 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatarri, A Thousand Plateaus25 
 
I want to turn now to the question of how literature 
might have anything to do with any of this and, 
following the thought of Jane Bennett, I want to say 
something like: Texts are objects that possess vibrant 
materiality; they are “quasi forces” that possess 
something like “tendencies of their own.” 26  They 
possess thing-power, and as much as they are able, they 
strive, in the words of Spinoza, to “persist in existing.” 
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25 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 11. 
26  Bennett describes “vibrant matter” as objects that are 
“active” and “earthy” and which possess a “not-quite-human 
capaciousness” (Vibrant Matter, 3). This is to ultimately think 
objects outside of their traditional roles “as passive stuff, as 
raw, brute, or inert” (vii) and to invent (dream?) for objects a 
lively ontology of “vital materiality” in which things “act as 
quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or 
tendencies of their own” outside of human will and human 
designs (viii). 




Texts are, in some sense, alive, while at the same time 
they are, even while produced by humans, utterly 
inhuman. No matter how many people—that is to say, 
characters—you put into a text, they still come out flat 
and dead. By which I mean, those aren’t really people. 
Anna Karenina doesn’t really exist and the only reason 
she feels alive to you when reading Tolstoy’s novel is 
because you animated her through a technique we 
humans are particularly good at—I think of it as a 
felicitous form of “lying to ourselves.” In addition, 
Michael Witmore reminds us that, 
  
Our work with narratives puts us in touch 
with forms of reduction or compression that 
are every bit as diagrammatic and so 
(potentially) inhuman as those who study the 
compression algorithms of physics or plane-
tary biology.  The key for us is the way in 
which narratives of human action introduce 
counterfactual ideals—impossible, limiting, 
but also operative and effectual—that are 
immanent in the objects we study, not simply 
projections of the creators or interpreters of 
those objects.27 
 
So, literary characters are potentially inhuman (ciphers, 
even) although we often treat them as if they are fully 
human (they’re more like symptoms, as well as 
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27 Michael Witmore, “We Have Never Not Been Inhuman,” in 
When Did We Become Post/human? ed. Eileen A. Joy and Craig 
Dionne, special issue of postmedieval: a journal of medieval 
cultural studies 1.1-2 (2010): 213 [208–214]. For a glimpse into 
Witmore’s work with the forms of compression present in 
early modern literary texts, especially Shakespeare, see his 
weblog Wine Dark Sea: http://winedarksea.org/. 




transitive signifiers, of the human 28 ). They possess 
something of the qualities of Bruno Latour’s actant—in 
Graham Harman’s words, “a force utterly deployed in 
the world” which is on the same ontological footing as 
everything else, including us. As Harman writes of 
Latour’s thinking on actants, if everything is on the 
same ontological footing, “this ends the tear-jerking 
modern rift between the knowing human subject and 
the unknowable outside world, since for Latour the 
isolated Kantian human is no more and no less an actor 
than are windmills, sunflowers, propane tanks, and 
Thailand.”29 Again: you are here. So is everything else. 
There is nowhere else to go. 
I am recalled to the biennial meeting of the New 
Chaucer Society in Siena, Italy in July 2010, when 
Aranye Fradenburg delivered her moving plenary 
lecture, “Living Chaucer,”30 where she argued that “the 
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28 On the idea of traveling and transitive signifiers and their 
“living on”-ness within the corpus of medieval literature and 
in contemporary life, as well as the ways in which they enable 
intersubjective formations between various actors, alive and 
dead, located in the past and present (with some formations 
more psychologically unsettling and dangerous and histori-
cally damaging than others, and some more affectively 
sustaining and effectual for progressive change), the entire 
ouevre of Aranye Fradenurg is indispensable; see, most 
recently, Aranye Fradenburg, “(Dis)continuity: A History of 
Dreaming,” in The Post-Historical Middle Ages, eds. Elizabeth 
Scala and Sylvia Frederico (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), 87–115, from whence I culled this essay’s dedicatory 
line. 
29 Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and 
Metaphysics (Melbourne: re.press, 2009), 14. 
30 This lecture has since been published: L.O. Aranye Fraden-
burg, “Living Chaucer,” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 33 
(2011): 41–64. I cite here my (perhaps imperfect) notes from 
the Siena meeting in July 2010 in order to remain faithful, if 
just for the momentary purposes of this essay, to the bodily 
presence of Fradenburg and my memory of her words and 




experience of narrative is a rapprochement with 
another mind,” that we share with an author like 
Chaucer a kind of intersubjectivity in which it is not 
always easy to tell where the self (his, ours) ends and 
Otherness (Chaucer, us, his characters, language, 
signifiers, etc.) begins. Let’s take this another step 
further and say that the experience of narrative is also a 
rapprochement with a “persisting object” that uses 
humans as an activation device, a sort of on-switch. We 
might tentatively qualify literature as a ‘quasi-object’ 
that is neither entirely an object nor either fully a 
subject but is nevertheless in the world as a ‘constructer 
of intersubjectivity’ in which the ‘we’ of any given 
moment is made in the “bursts and occultation’s of the 
‘I’”31 as texts are shuttled back and forth, over vast 
stretches of time, between shelves and tables and 
readers and other texts which may be, in Serres’s terms, 
only “stations and relays.” Who can tell when a text, or 
a reader, is ‘it’ and when it is an ‘I’ (or a ‘we’)? As Serres 
also writes, we don’t know whether quasi-objects, 
which are also quasi-subjects, “are beings or relations, 
tatters of being or ends of relations. By them, the 
principle of individuation can be transmitted or can get 
stuck.” 32  Put another way, we might say, following 
Latour, that a literary text, like the quasi-object, like 
ourselves, is “simultaneously real, discursive, and 
social,” belonging “to nature, to the collective, and to 
discourse,” and “bearing the traces of Being that are 
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arguments as she was delivering this lecture, and to the 
further thoughts she sparked in me at that time—a “shared 
mental experience,” in Fradenburg’s own terms (“Living 
Chaucer,” 43). 
31 Michel Serres, The Parasite, trans. Larry R. Schehr (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 227. 
32 Serres, The Parasite, 227–28. 




distributed everywhere among beings.”33  
We might think, also, of literature as a kind of 
living and open signaling system, an endlessly looping 
reel-to-reel tape-feed (even when interrupted by static, 
worms chewing on the wires, bad translators, fire, and 
floods), that could also be described, as Fradenburg 
suggested in Siena, as a “territorial assemblage,” one 
that enables an endless series of aparallel relations 
within and across various temporal zones that are, in 
some sense, always here with us now and also located 
in the Great Outdoors of a forest of textual data that 
may or may not always be accessible to us (or to our 
particular questions).34 The human body is itself a time 
capsule of all previous bodies, just as texts are time 
capsules of all previous writing, and the “junk”—
whether junk-DNA or spilled ink in the margins, is 
always with us. Nothing is ever lost, although if Harman 
is right, everything is always withdrawing from every-
thing else. Again: you are here, but a part of you is also 
somewhere else. It is the same with texts. Although, 
strictly speaking, that “somewhere else” is also here. 
You can’t get away from here, and the exits of the 
universe are locked.  
According to Harman, all objects in the world—
which can be armies, persons, ants, chalk, earthworms, 
raindrops, stones, etc.—are always in retreat from each 
other, always withdrawing, and every possible relation 
between any two objects is also an object. While 
Harman doesn’t deny reciprocity and symbiosis and 
even celebrates them, he insists on a “weird realism” 
whereby no one real object could ever really “touch” 
any other real object. Nevertheless, there are sensual 
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33 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Cath-
erine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 64, 
66. 
34 On this point, see Michael Witmore, “The Ancestral Text,” 
Wine Dark Sea, May 9, 2011, http://winedarksea.org/?p=979. 




relations, and he uses the term “allure” to describe the 
distance between any real object and the qualities that 
stream out of it, constituting the sensual object with 
which we engage. As he puts it, “Whereas real objects 
withdraw, sensual objects lie directly before us, frosted 
over with a swirling, superfluous outer shell.”35 There-
fore, real objects can only “touch” other real objects by 
way of a sensual object, a “vicar of causation,” as it 
were, that leads to ever more new objects being 
formed—in other words, new relations. Furthermore, 
and this is the really important implication of Harman’s 
thought for me in thinking about how this might help 
us to formulate a speculative realist literary studies, “we 
do not perceive insofar as we merely exist, but only 
insofar as we are pieces of larger objects composed of 
us and other things.” And it is in what Harman calls 
“the molten inner core” of these larger objects where 
sentience takes place, “as the perception of sensual 
objects.”36 For Harman sentience is happening all the 
time between all sorts of objects, and—who knows?—
maybe even stalks of wheat and bricks “encounter” 
each other in some fashion in some sort of wheat-and-
brick assemblage mediated by a sensuous vicar, which 
could be a person, or an ant, or a moonbeam. 
In Harman’s speculative realism, “the world is 
packed full of ghostly real objects signaling to each 
other from inscrutable depths, unable to touch one 
another fully.” And yet, the “side-by-side proximity of 
real and sensual objects is the occasion for a con-
nection between a real object inside an intention”—for 
example, my desire to be absorbed by these objects—!
!
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35 Graham Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” Collapse, Vol. 
II: Speculative Realism (Oxford: Urbanomic, 2007), 179 [171–
205]. 
36 Graham Harman, “On Asymmetrical Causation: Influence 
Without Recompense,” Parallax 16.1 (2010): 107 [96–109]. 




and another real object lying outside it. In this 
way, shafts or freight tunnels are constructed 
between objects that otherwise remain quar-
antined in private vacuums.37 
 
Literary criticism, especially in medieval studies 
but really in any-studies of texts that are, in some sense, 
already-there (i.e., historical), might be reimagined as a 
networks of sensuous object relations within which a 
more capacious yet still bounded (feeling) sentience 
might take place—“bounded” in the sense of: every-
thing was here, and then we arrived, and now we’re all 
here. Start digging, but remember, we can’t get out of 
here. Tunnel away all you want, for, as Harman says, 
 
We do not step beyond anything, but are 
more like moles tunneling through wind, 
water, and ideas no less than through speech-
acts, texts, anxiety, wonder, and dirt. We do 
not transcend the world, but only descend or 
burrow towards its numberless underground 
cavities—each a sort of kaleidoscope where 
sensual objects spread their wings and colors. 
There is neither finitude nor negativity in the 
heart of objects.38 
 
SO, HERE’S THIS PLAN I HAVE 
 
Those who care only to generate arguments almost never 
generate objects. New objects, however, are the sole and 
sacred fruit of writers, thinkers, politicians, travellers, lovers, 
and inventers. 
 
Graham Harman, “On Vicarious Causation” 
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37 Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” 187, 201. 
38 Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” 193. 




So, what now? As regards medieval studies, literary 
studies, the humanities under the aegis of new spec-
ulative realist, object-oriented, and post/humanist 39 
work that encourages us to develop better and more 
ethical styles of collectivity?  
Step One might be following Julian Yates’s sugges-
tion (and I think this is a step scholars such as Jane 
Bennett, Stacy Alaimo, Myra Hird, Noreen Giffney, Rosi 
Braidotti, Graham Harman, Levi Bryant, Sarah Franklin, 
Karen Barad, Donna Haraway, Freya Mathews, Timothy 
Morton, Cary Wolfe, Jeffrey Cohen, Karl Steel, and 
many others are mightily engaged in at present): to 
force the “solipsistic human Dasein . . . to idle and to 
listen or try to listen to the figurative chatter, songs or 
screams of the countless non-human actors whose 
manufactured declensions fund the networks that 
wrote the ‘human’ as self-identical being.”40 The hu-
man being, but also the humanist, as slow recording 
device. Think of the experimental artist Douglas Gor-
don who slowed down Hitchcock’s Psycho to 24 
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39 By placing the backward slash between ‘post’ and ‘human’ 
(post/human), I mean to denote a state of historical affairs by 
which, although we may have witnessed a certain dissolution 
of the liberal humanist subject as the world’s sovereign 
meaning-maker, as well as the emergence of new non- and 
quasi-human ‘intelligent’ technologies, such as cybernetics, 
robotics, and bioinformatics that may supersede us, while we 
have also gained new insights into the fact that the ‘human’ 
has always been unstable, contingent, hybrid, accidental, 
other to itself, ‘animal,’ etc. (‘we have never been human’), 
nevertheless, the human is always left open as a productive 
question, both there and not-there at once. 
40 Julian Yates, “It’s (for) You; or, The Tele-t/r/opical Post-
human,” in When Did We Become Post/human? ed. Eileen A. 
Joy and Craig Dionne, special issue of postmedieval: a journal 
of medieval cultural studies 1.1-2 (2010): 225 [223–234]. 




hours.41 Or the sound artist Lief Inge who stretched out 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony for 24 hours. 42  Or 
Longplayer, a piece of music started in 1999 that is 
designed to go on playing for a thousand years, and 
whose chief “listening post” is a lighthouse in 
London?43 Something like that, only tuned in to the 
nonhuman, while also recognizing that these endeav-
ors would still constitute human follies. But these 
would be follies borne out of a love, and not a 
capricious and careless use, of the world. 
Step Two would be to recognize that everything is 
a person of some sort and to start forming alliances and 
“personnel services committees” and special packet-
switching stations with as many self-objects and 
literary-objects and other object-objects as possible in 
order to build a larger and more capacious and 
“stranger” sentience that could then form a sort of 
autopoetic system that might take better account of 
how, in Morton’s words, “[e]verything is [already] inti-
mate with everything else.”44  
This will require a Step Three as well, which 
probably really comes before Step One: self-donation, 
making ourselves hospitable so that things and events 
can take place in and with and around us, so that the 
world can happen to us for a change. The fact of the 
matter is, we’re already “occupied,” so let’s make it 
official now with a sign posted out front that says, 
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41 See Lee Ferguson, “Douglas Gordon’s Stunning 24 Hour 
Psycho,” CBC News, September 13, 2010, http://www.cbc. 
ca/news/tiff2010/2010/09/douglas-gordons-stunning-24-hou 
r-psycho-update-screens-at-tiffs-lightbox.html. 
42 See Kyle Gann, “Norwegian Minimalist Raises Beethoven’s 
Molto Adagio Bar,” The Village Voice, 10 Feb. 2004, http:// 
www.villagevoice.com/2004-02-10/music/norwegian-minam 
alist-raises-beethoven-molto-adagio-bar/. 
43 On Longplayer, see http://longplayer.org/what/overview. 
php. 
44 Morton, The Ecological Thought, 78. 




“Hello, Everybody!” Related to this: making room, like a 
broom of the system, for the initial starting conditions 
of spontaneous acts of combustive generosity and 
impossible unconditionalities. Making space, without 
liens, for the arrival of strangers whose trajectories are 
unmappable in advance. 
Step Four: making new objects, giving birth to 
things, radical acts of coupling and natality and hetero-
queer reproduction. Until you can’t make things any-
more. That’s when you drop dead. But don’t worry . . . 
you’ll always be with us, by which I mean: with me. I’ll 
never forget you and I trust you’ll do the same for me. 
I’m talking to you but also to Sparkles, one of my many 
creaturely companions, the hawthorn outside my study 
window, the red berries budding on the hawthorn, the 
pebbled glass of the window itself, my favorite wine 
glass, all the random notes and letters rustling on my 
desk, and the imaginary pen I write my imaginary 
books with that will never get published, all the lives I’ll 
never live but experience in literature, all the friends 
met and unmet, behind and up ahead in the future(s) 
we dream and play at together. We’ll designate 
mourners and record their grieving, then play it on an 
endless feedback loop machine that has a one-
thousand-year battery. In other words, we’ll keep 
writing. Some call this literature. Or medieval studies. 
Or the humanities, which need to get more, and not 
less human. 
But this will also entail, contra to but also with our 
tears and our ultimately frail efforts at projects of 
memento mori, better developing what Simon Critchley 
has called “the experience of an ever-divided humorous 
self-relation,” where we would work to find ourselves 
“ridiculous,” to see ourselves from the outside, and to 
“smile”—humor as “a powerful example of what we 
might call the human being’s eccentricity with regard 




to itself.”45  
In the end, this what ethics is all about: Slowing 
down, paying better attention to what is close at hand 
and always already intimate with us—which is every-
thing—welcoming the Other, not taking ourselves too 
seriously, and working together to add something of 
beauty to the world, which is always more than truth 
could ever calculate or bear. 
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45 Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commit-
ment, Politics of Resistance (London: Verso, 2007), 86. 
